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The relationship between the voice and violence, in particular the violation of the body,              
has a long intellectual and cultural history, one which has been explored by Elaine              
Scarry and Adriana Cavarero in their respective texts ​The Body in Pain ​(1985) and ​A               
più voci: Per una filosofia dell’espressione vocale​/​For More than One Voice ​(2005). In             
this article I read Scarry’s account of the structure of torture, found in the first chapter of                 
The Body in Pain​, alongside Cavarero’s ​For More than One Voice ​and ​Orrorismo:             
Ovvero della violenza sull’inerme​/​Horrorism (2011). This serves a dual purpose: on the            
one hand to clarify the underlying rationale in Scarry’s account of torture; and on the               
other to link Cavarero’s notion of ‘horrorism’ (ibid. 29) to what she describes in ​For More                
than One Voice ​as ‘a vocal phenomenology of uniqueness’ (2005: 7). 
In the first half of this article I argue that Scarry’s account of torture is implicitly                
committed to an Aristotelian distinction between ​phone ​and ​semantike​. This becomes           
apparent when one reads ​The Body in Pain via Cavarero’s account of ​logos ​found in               
For More than One Voice​. ​Further, however, I argue that resources can be found in               
Scarry’s account of torture that undermine this distinction: on closer inspection Scarry’s            
account can be read as challenging the primacy of ​semantike ​over ​phone​, indicating             
that the cries of the body in pain communicate a uniqueness that is indifferent to the                
semantic content that has been supposedly destroyed in the scene of torture. Scarry             
 
and Cavarero’s accounts compliment one another, in that Cavarero’s insistence on the            
importance of the distinction between ​phone ​and ​semantike ​is made starkly clear in             
Scarry’s account of torture. I argue that in Scarry’s account, the torturer violently enacts              
what Cavarero describes as the devocalisation of ​logos ​(ibid. 33): that is, the tendency              
in the western metaphysical tradition to ignore the fact that ​logos is both ​semantike ​and               
phone - that it is both reasoned speech and mere voice - and instead privilege only the                 
semantic component. In effect, in the scene of torture that Scarry portrays, the process              
of torture actualises this devocalisation of ​logos ​through the infliction of violence (and             
the manifesting of pain) in the body of the other. In torture the body in pain is made to                   
force the separation of ​phone from ​semantike​, positioning ​semantike ​with the torturer            
and ​phone ​with the body in pain. The embodied voice of the prisoner is used as a                 
vehicle for the disembodied reason of the torturer, thus ridding the torturer of his              
dependence on the materiality of his body. In this way, I argue, in Scarry’s account of                
torture the torturer attempts to speak without his body. 
The second half of the article proceeds to contrast Cavarero’s account of the             
ethical implications of the exposure to extreme forms of violence - an account which is               
formalised in ​Horrorism but is present in prefigurative form in ​For More than One Voice ​-                
with Scarry’s account of torture. I argue that what is particularly horrifying in Scarry’s              
account of torture is not the torturer’s disregard for the singular uniqueness of the              
prisoner - Cavarero’s central ethical concern - but rather the torturer’s recognition and             
exploitation of this singular uniqueness; the manner in which the torturer places this             
uniqueness in a suspended state of dissolution. This is made apparent by reading two              
 
examples that Cavarero deploys in ​For More than One Voice ​- the nymph Echo and the                
child Hurbinek - in the light of her more recent account of horrorism. Finally, by reading                
these examples in this manner I pose some critical questions to Cavarero’s account of              
the human voice as being ‘destined to speech’ (2005: 211). 
 
The devocalisation of the pained body’s ​logos 
In the first chapter of ​The Body in Pain Scarry offers a ‘structure’ (1985: 27) of torture,                 
thinking through the phenomenology of the unilateral exposure to extreme pain that is             
characteristic of torture. Central to the structure of torture, for Scarry, is the distinction              
between the body and the voice: put briefly, when one is exposed to extreme pain one’s                
sense of language, self and world, typified by voice, are placed in a process of               
destruction, while one’s sense of body becomes utterly overbearing (ibid. 35). For            
Scarry, speaking and thinking, both forms of self-extension, become increasingly          
difficult under extreme pain. When one is in pain one cries out; language typically              
evades the person in extreme pain, as does, so Scarry argues, thought. Scarry uses              
‘voice’, ‘speech’ and ‘language’ interchangeably throughout the second chapter of ​The           
Body in Pain​, but what is most prominent in the chapter is the process whereby the                
semantic content of speech is destroyed in the experience of extreme pain, leaving one              
with groans, wails and cries. As such, if Scarry does not make explicit reference to the                
Aristotelian conception of Man, it is nonetheless implicit throughout her account of            
torture. For Aristotle, Man (always Man, and this is not insignificant) was understood as              
 
the ​zoon logon echon ​- ‘the living creature who has ​logos​’ (Cavarero 2005: 34) as               
Cavarero interprets it. Cavarero reminds us that ​logos ​was figured in the Greek tradition              
as ​phone semantike​, that is, as semantic voice, or what often gets translated simply as               
‘speech’ (although as we will see this single word elides the fact that implicit in ​logos ​are                 
two, albeit inseparable, conceptions: ​semantike ​and ​phone​). Far more than mere voice,            
Man possesses speech. It is the ​semantike of ​logos - its capacity to signify, to endow                
Man with reason - which is significant. The ​semantike ​of ​logos ​distinguishes Man from              
other creatures and other animals: if Man signifies through his speech, for other animals              
they are limited by their mere voice, their cries and wails simply being signs of pleasure                
and pain. Slaves and women would, for Aristotle, fall somewhere between the two: they              
do not possess speech - otherwise they would be the equal of Man - but they can                 
recognise speech - otherwise Man could not make productive use of them (Aristotle             
1992: 69). Stuart Elden is certainly right to point out that it is important to remember                1
that the ​having ​or the ​possession ​of ​logos ​was not simply a unilateral having or               
possession: he says, ‘​in reading the term ​zoon logon echon ​we should bear in the mind                
that to say that the human is the animal or being that has language is not to say that                   
humans merely possess it, but that they are, at the same time possessed by it’ (2005:                
286). Nonetheless, in the Hellenic philosophical tradition there is an overwhelming           
sense that for slaves and for women they are far more ​possessed by ​logos than they                
are the ​possessors​, and similarly that animals are utterly possessed by passions which             
dictate their vocalisations, and that if Man is possessed by ​logos ​it is a possession               
1 Cf. Page DuBois, ​Torture and Truth ​(1991: 66). 
 
which never calls into question his presumed reason and rationality. 
For Cavarero then, ​phone ​and ​semantike​, while both being central to the            
philosophical understanding of ​logos​, are not equally recognised in this tradition.           
Semantike is consistently privileged over ​phone​, a privileging which, Cavarero          
suggests, operates through clear gendered stereotypes. For Cavarero: 
the symbolic patriarchal order that identifies the masculine with reason          
and the feminine with the body is precisely an order that privileges the             
semantic with respect to the vocal. In other words, even the andocentric            
tradition knows that the voice comes from “the vibration of a throat of             
flesh” and, precisely because it knows this, it catalogues the voice with the             
body. The voice becomes secondary, ephemeral, and inessential -         
reserved for women (2005: 6). 
In ​For More than One Voice ​and much of her other work, Cavarero attempts to disrupt                
this partitioning of the human (with its concomitant privileging of Man) not simply by              
claiming that women are in fact the possessors of speech, but further by insisting on the                
significance of the vocalic quality of ​phone​, not only for women but for ‘the incarnate               
singularity of every existence insofar as she or he manifests her- or himself vocally’              
(ibid. 7). Cavarero’s central concern is to stress that ‘logocentrism radically denies to the              
voice a meaning of its own that is not always already destined to speech’ (ibid. 13).                
Cavarero argues that prior to any communication of semantic content the voice first             
communicates the uniqueness of the person who is vocalising: ‘the truth of the vocal [...]               
proclaims simply that every human being is a unique being, and is capable of              
 
manifesting this uniqueness with the voice, calling and infecting the other, and enjoying             
this reciprocal manifestation’ (ibid. 6-7). Cavarero’s account of uniqueness is drawn           
directly from that of Hannah Arendt (1998: 176) and is a fundamental component of her               
theoretical project. Although the status of uniqueness and its relationship to the human             
cannot be fully explored in this article, critical questions will be raised towards this              
article’s end which trace the limits of Cavarero’s account of uniqueness, particularly as it              
relates to Cavarero’s claim that voice is ‘destined to speech’ (ibid. 13). For now it should                
be noted that the status of uniqueness maintains an ambivalent relationship to the             
human: on the one hand uniqueness disarms a generalised conception of the human by              
insisting on each existent’s concrete materiality; while on the other uniqueness, as            
proper to every human, is in danger of reproducing precisely this generality. 
 
For Cavarero, uniqueness is consistently overlooked by a tradition that both only            
regards ​phone ​to the extent that it is the vehicle for ​semantike and further is committed                
to the theorisation of Man in general, rather than particular, non-generalisable men, or             
women, or many others. As Cavarero argues, even in lines of research ‘dedicated to              2
challenging the dominion of language, the voice of vocality insists on presenting itself as              
a voice in general’ (ibid. 12). For the most part, however, ​phone ​is simply ignored when                
seen alongside ​semantike​, or rather, following Cavarero, ​phone ​is ​captured ​by           
semantike (ibid. 35). This capturing renders ​phone ​superfluous, not only by making it             
2 This is most clearly articulated in Cavarero’s ​Tu che mi guardi, tu che mi racconti​/​Relating Narratives                                 
(2000), where Cavarero argues that ‘“Man” is a universal that applies to everyone precisely because it is                                 
no one. It disincarnates itself from the living singularity of each one, while claiming to substantiate it’                                 
(ibid. 9). 
 
dependent on ​semantike​, but further by privileging the visuality of ​semantike ​over the             
orality of ​phone​: 
[w]hat we call “signified” is, in fact, for metaphysics an object of thought             
that is characterized by visibility and clarity. The problem here is not only             
the relation between the realm of thought and that of speech, nor is it              
simply the usual metaphysical privileging of thought over speech. Rather,          
at stake is the fundamental gesture that locates the principle of the system             
of signification, of the signified, in the visual sphere (ibid.). 
Cavarero continues: ‘[m]etaphysics has always dreamed of a videocentric order of pure            
signifieds. Verbal signification is, from its perspective, a hindrance - especially when it             
unfolds acoustically in vocal speech’ (ibid. 40). ​Logos​’ ambivalent structure, referring           
both to reason and ​to voice, is collapsed, or always in the process of collapsing,               
towards the ‘noetic’ ​(ibid. 39) realm of knowledge governed by the static metaphors of              
vision and away from the dynamic metaphors of sound. The flesh of the body, and the                
sonority of sound from which reasoned speech can never escape, is effaced; ​logos ​is              
devocalised. 
The devocalisation of ​logos ​becomes an especially pressing issue given that, as            
has been already indicated, ​logos ​plays a crucial role for Aristotle in distinguishing Man              
from other animals. The distinction rests on the possession of speech in the former, and               
this is central to Man’s status as a properly ​political​ animal: 
[Nature] has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of            
 
speech. Speech is something different from voice, which is possessed by           
other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure (Aristotle             
1992: 60).  3
This account, and in particular Aristotle’s separation of voice and speech, has been             
central to the conception of the human as it has been inherited in the western tradition                
(Bourke 2011: 7, 29-60; Rancière 1999: 1-19; Agamben 2007: 3-11). Cavarero notes            
that, following Aristotle, ‘[t]he voice prior to speech or independent of speech is             
therefore simply an animal voice - an ​a-logic ​and ​a-semantic ​phonation’ (2005: 34). This              
is important when we consider Scarry’s arguments concerning torture. For Scarry, when            
one suffers extreme pain one’s capacity to deploy language - unequivocally the            
semantike ​of ​logos​’ signifying voice - is destroyed. There is something crucial to pain              
that, for Scarry, ‘actively destroys’ (1985: 4) language, ‘bringing about an immediate            
reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes                
before language is learned’ (ibid.). When thought through Aristotle’s schema, in torture            
the ​semantike ​of ​logos ​is stripped away leaving nothing but ​phone​; pure voice. It should               
be noted that the ‘purity’ ​of this desemanticised voice can already be called into              
question. As Joanna Bourke has demonstrated, to claim that pain robs speech of its              
semantic component is to ignore a plethora of counter-examples: in Bourke’s words,            
‘the same people who declare their suffering to be “unspeakable” or “absolutely            
evanescent” may then go on to tell their story of pain in exquisite detail’ (2014: 28).                
3 It should be noted that for Aristotle it is not speech ​per se that makes Man a political animal, but rather                                           
speech’s function in signifying what is proper to the ​koinonia politike​, or ‘political community’.                           
Cavarero’s reading is exemplary on this account: see ‘Logos and Politics’ in ​For More than One Voice                                 
(2005: 183-188). 
 
Pain, notes Bourke, is ‘inherently social’ (ibid. 46): it is not an isolated experience within               
a person, as Scarry maintains, but rather emerges as a consequence of sociality. It is               
on this basis that Bourke charges Scarry with falling into the ‘ontological trap’ (ibid. 5) of                
conflating the metaphorisation of pain with with ‘descriptions of an actual entity’ (ibid.).             
Rather than pain being an entity that carries ontological weight and resides within             
people - fundamentally inaccessible to others and, as a consequence, destructive of            
forms of communication - Bourke proposes that one thinks of pain ‘as an event’ (ibid.).               
In this way one becomes a ‘person-in-pain’ (ibid.) through one’s recognition, naming,            
and storying of one’s pain, a process that ‘can never be wholly private’ (ibid. 6).               
However, as Bourke herself notes when reading Jean Améry’s account of being tortured             
(Améry 1976), the ‘extreme example’ (Bourke 2014: 30) of torture is marked by             
‘incommunicability’ (ibid.). In this way the hard distinction between pure voice and            
reasoned speech that has its roots in Aristotle is maintained in this article, not because               
it is deemed the correct account of pain, but because it has influenced understandings              
of extreme pain and thus can be mobilised to help make sense of them. 
Following Aristotle’s schema, torture is concerned with the forcible separation of           
speech from voice and thus concerned with the violent resolution of the ambivalence of              
logos​: that it reduces one to an animalistic state ‘anterior to language’. Or, perhaps              
more accurately, to an infantile state: unlike the animal, which is not presumed to have               
the capacity to possess the ​semantike ​of ​logos​, the infant is understood as being              
‘destined to speech’ (2005: 13) in Cavarero’s words. As it will be argued towards the               4
4 Cf. Giorgio Agamben’s ​Infancy and History ​(2007). 
 
end of this article, the conclusion that the body in pain is animal or infantile can be                 
refuted using resources that Cavarero offers, and this despite Cavarero’s insistence on            
voice’s ‘destination to speech’ (ibid. 210) which would otherwise unwittingly bolster this            
conclusion. First, however, it is necessary to offer a more detailed reading of Scarry’s              
account of voice in the scene of torture. Scarry’s account makes clear the crucial role               
violence plays in manifesting an understanding of Man as a disembodied, reasoning            
being, freed from an embodied voice and its associative lungs, throat and tongue, and              
necessarily actualised in relation to the violation of another. For Scarry, voice is             
important for two reasons: first, the torturer’s voice objectifies the fact that the prisoner’s              
voice has been, or is in a process of being, destroyed; second, the absence left by the                 
stripping away of the language of the prisoner (the ​semantike ​of ​logos​) is filled, or               
perhaps rather colonised, by the torturer. 
Scarry argues that as well as inflicting pain the torturer also objectifies the             
destruction of the prisoner’s world. The torturer does this by juxtaposing their world             
against the ‘small and shredded world’ (1985: 36) of the prisoner, ​and in so doing               
further contributes to the destruction of the prisoner’s world. As Idelbar Avelar argues,             
‘[i]n the modern technology of torture the moment of interrogation is constitutive of the              
infliction of pain’ (2004: 31). Interrogation may be a common way of enacting this              
objectification, but it is not the only way. As Scarry says, ‘[t]he confession is one crucial                
demonstration of this absent world, but there are others’ (1985: 38). These include the              
torturer’s ‘weapons, his acts, and his words’ (ibid.); that is, the fact that he exists as an                 
embodied, relational being, extending himself out into the world. The interrogation is a             
 
performative gesture, a particular strategy which exploits, bears witness to and           
objectifies the disjuncture between the world of the torturer (marked by myriad forms of              
self extension) and the world of the prisoner (which for Scarry extends barely beyond              
the surface of the prisoner’s body). As Scarry argues, ‘for the prisoner, the body and its                
pain are overwhelmingly present and voice, world, and self are absent; for the torturer,              
voice, world, and self are overwhelmingly present and the body and pain are absent’              
(ibid. 46). For Scarry there is thus a direct relationship between the prisoner’s voice, self               
and world, and that of the torturer: the torturer instrumentalises the prisoner’s            
deconstructed world to enlarge their own sense of world (and the regime that the              
torturer may represent): as Scarry says, ‘[i]t is only the prisoner’s steadily shrinking             
ground that wins for the torturer his swelling sense of territory’ (ibid. 36). 
One can see, then, the intimate relationship between the fetishisation of           
disembodied reason - the ​semantike ​of ​logos​, which as Cavarero rightly notes is always              
dominant over the embodied vocality of ​phone - and the infliction of violence on the               
other: following Scarry, a desire to rid oneself of body in the name of ​noetic reason is                 
achievable through the making overwhelmingly present the body of another, via the            
medium of violence. It is precisely the absence of the ​semantike ​of ​logos ​in the other,                5
achieved through the infliction of extreme pain, that is a condition for the attainment of               
this disembodied, reasoning, ​noetic being: for Cavarero, ‘[t]hought as male, the body            
loses its carnal reality and becomes a conceptual form’ (2015b: 134). Torture, one could              
say, manufactures a sense of omniscience and omnipotence; an approximation of God,            
5 Cf. Page duBois, ​Torture and Truth ​(1991). 
 
or shock and awe; an ‘apotheosis’ in the original sense of the word. As Cavarero               6 7
notes, it is precisely because ​logos cannot escape the vocality of ​phone ​that it needs to                
violently resolve its constitutive ambiguity by radically separating ​phone ​and ​semantike           
into their properly gendered expressions: the devocalisation of logos leaves ‘the           
feminine figures to embody what remains - namely, the voice’ (Cavarero 2005: 207). 
Scarry makes the relationship between a desire for a disembodied reason and            
the violation of another clear in what is a centrally important passage from her account               
of torture. Scarry argues: 
To assent to words that through the thick agony of the body can be only               
dimly heard, or to reach aimlessly for the name of a person or a place that                
has barely enough cohesion to hold its shape as word and none to bond it               
to its worldly referent, is a way of saying, yes, all is almost gone now,               
there is almost nothing left now, even this voice, the sounds I am making,              
no longer form my words but the words of another (1985: 35). 
What is most apparent here is the separation of ​logos​’ ​phone semantike​. Voice, or              
phone​, is stripped of any capacity for signification it previously had; voice becomes ‘the              
sounds I am making’ which ‘no longer form my words’. Crucially, however, the vocality              
6 Rachel Pain (2015) explicitly links experiences of domestic violence to military tactics such as shock and                 
awe, arguing both that domestic violence, typically seen as an intimate violence, is also a political                
violence, and that the violence of war, typically seen as a political violence, is also an intimate violence. In                   
both cases gender is crucial for conceptualising the dynamics of these scenes of violence, and I would                 
suggest that the idealisation of the reasoning, disembodied Man as the universal subject of philosophy               
can also account for something of what is occurring in the ‘shock and awe’ domestic violence that Pain                  
identifies (ibid. 67). 
7 Cf. Simona Forti’s ​New Demons​, where Forti argues that there is a relation between man’s incapacity to                  
approximate God’s omnipotence and the infliction of extreme violence (2015: 93-94). 
 
of voice is not left simply to exist but rather forms ‘the words of another’. The torturer in                  
this manner rids himself of ​phone​, colonising the ​phone of another which makes             
materially manifest the ​semantike ​of his ​logos​, realising an ideal which has long been at               
the heart of the Western tradition. Understood in this way, the torturer is able to speak                
without his body. But there is another way of reading this passage, a way which               
concerns the question of communication. 
As has been indicated, one can read this particular account that Scarry offers as              
being exemplary of the challenge that experiences of extreme pain pose:           
communication is radically undermined because the semantic content of said          
communication is estranged from the person who is vocalising. And yet, Scarry claims             8
that the vocalising of this estranged semantic content is nonetheless ‘a way of saying’. It               
would appear then that even after ​semantike ​is stripped from ​phone​, the very process of               
this stripping is saying something: that is, something is being communicated. Scarry            
suggests that the content of the estranged speech of the one in extreme pain ‘is a way                 
of saying’ that my voice is not my own; this is communicated despite the words not                
having enough cohesion to bond them to their ‘worldly referent’. What Scarry is             
indicating is what is, for Cavarero, so frequently overlooked (or even actively effaced) in              
considerations of ​logos​: that the ​semantike ​of ​logos is intimately connected to ​phone​,             
and further that there is something communicated in ​phone ​which is utterly indifferent to              
semantic content. ​Phone ​is not a ‘remainder’ (Cavarero 2005: 13) or a ‘leftover’ (ibid.),              
rather it is an ‘originary excess [...] the sphere of the voice is constitutively broader than                
8 For more on the ‘estrangement’ of pain see the second chapter of Joanna Bourke’s ​The Story of Pain                                     
(2014: 27-52). 
 
speech’ (ibid.). Whatever speech may communicate, first it communicates ‘the acoustic,           
empirical, material relationality of singular voice’ (ibid.), that is, ‘a vocal phenomenology            
of uniqueness’ (ibid. 7). Following Hannah Arendt, Cavarero argues that voice signifies            9
first that there is a particular, unique existent: it communicates not ​what someone is but               
who they are. This ​who - expressed not through ​noetic ​reason but through embodied              
voice or, in another formulation of Cavarero’s, not through philosophy but through            
narration (2000: 52) - is a non-generalisable who, a who which doesn’t make the              
mistake of philosophy in asking after ​what Man (or even Woman) is, but rather ​who men                
and women (and many other people) are (ibid. 50). In Scarry’s account uniqueness is              
communicated precisely because it is being violated: because there is a particular,            
non-generalised person - a ​who rather than a ​what - who is unilaterally exposed to               
extreme pain. As it will now be suggested, however, this uniqueness is not incidental              10
to torture but is actively exploited by the torturer. This is, to use Cavarero’s word, the                
‘horrorism’ (2011) of torture, however a closer analysis of Scarry’s account of torture will              
help clarify precisely what it is that is horrifying, in a way that will shift, even if only                  
slightly, the account of horrorism offered by Cavarero. 
 
The horror of torture 
9 To take Cavarero seriously, it is crucial to understand her claim of human uniqueness on its own terms;                                     
that is, it would be a mistake for one to read this claim as a generalised claim, when implicit in the claim                                           
is the recognition of specificity that is central to the notion of uniqueness. If all are unique, their                                   
uniqueness is theirs (even if it is inevitably tied up with the presence of others). By understanding                                 
uniqueness as a particular quality not of ​the human but of ​this ​human, the naive universalism that                                 
assumes all have equal access to uniqueness is avoided. 
10 Cf. Judith Butler’s reading of Levinas in the final chapter of ​Precarious Life​ (2006: 133-134). 
 
In ​Horrorism ​Cavarero draws a distinction between terror and horror, arguing that the             
term “horrorism” is better able to account for various forms of contemporary violence, as              
well as maintaining a greater ethical valence in that it is articulated ‘as though all the                
innocent victims, instead of their killers, ought to determine the name’ (ibid. 3). Cavarero              
offers various examples of contemporary forms of horrorism: suicide bombing (ibid.);           
aerial bombing (ibid. 1-2, 27-28, 94-95); the London bombings of 7th July 2005 (ibid.              
18-19); concentration camps (ibid. 40); and the torture conducted at Abu Ghraib (ibid.             
106-115). What these examples indicate is that proper to horrorism is the destruction of              
the uniqueness of a person, often as it is expressed through the body (although it will be                 
suggested that the body is not the central condition for an occurrence of horrorism), and               
that it is enacted on the helpless; that is, those who have no capacity to defend against                 
it. 
As a form of violence, horrorism ‘offends the ontological dignity that the human             
figure possesses’ (ibid. 9). Its principal target is the singular uniqueness of the human,              
which for Cavarero is most evident in the destruction of the body, particularly the head               
and face (ibid.). Horrorism is a ‘violence whose precise aim is to erase singularity’ (ibid.               
19). In this sense the killing of the human is incidental to horrorism, even as it so                 
frequently accompanies scenes of horror: 
As its corporeal symptoms testify, the physics of horror has nothing to do             
with the instinctive reaction to the threat of death. It has rather to do with               
instinctive disgust for a violence that, not content merely to kill because            
killing would be too little, aims to destroy the uniqueness of the body,             
 
tearing at its constitutive vulnerability. What is at stake is not the end of a               
human life but the human condition itself, as incarnated in the singularity            
of vulnerable bodies (ibid. 8). 
Cavarero goes on: ‘it is not so much killing that is in question here but rather                
dehumanizing and savaging the body as body, destroying it in its figural unity, sullying it               
[...] nullifying human beings even more than killing them’ (ibid. 9). Torture, for             11
Cavarero, typifies this most clearly: ‘[t]he dead body, no matter how mutilated, is only a               
residue of the scene of torture’ (ibid. 31). The horror of torture also makes clear, for                12
Cavarero, that what is proper to horrorism is its enactment on the ‘helpless’ or the               
‘defenseless’ (ibid. 30): 
[d]efenseless and in the power of the other, the helpless person finds            
himself substantially in a condition of passivity, undergoing violence he          
can neither flee from nor defend against. The scene is entirely tilted            
toward unilateral violence. There is no symmetry, no parity, no reciprocity.           
As in the exemplary case of the infant, it is the other who is in a position of                  
11 Cavarero here, as in many other places, is indebted to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the Nazi                 
concentration camps and the killing of man’s ‘uniqueness’ (Arendt 2003: 134-137). See also Cavarero’s              
‘Narrative Against Destruction’ (2015a: 4-5). 
12 As Cavarero notes, torture’s etymology lies in the latin ​torquere​: ‘to twist and distort the body’ (2011:                  
32). ​Torquere ​itself is linked to ​tortum​, a wrong or injustice; cf. tort law, or Jacques Rancière’s ​tort​,                  
translated as ‘wrong’ in the English versions of his ​Disagreement ​(Rancière 1999: 21; Panagia 2006: 91).                
Interestingly, the French ​supplice that Foucault draws on extensively in ​Discipline and Punish (1991),              
translated into the English as ‘torture’, is rooted in the latin ​supplicium​, which signifies kneeling in                
supplication, as well as torture, punishment and suffering. ‘Supplication’ is rooted in the latin ​supplicāre​,               
the ​plicāre ​meaning ‘to bend’. So both examples of the infliction of suffering - ​torquere and ​supplicāre -                  
are linked to a torsional force, a twisting or bending, where the body comports itself in response to an                   
outside power: either in deference (to bend one’s knee) or in pain. 
 
omnipotence (ibid.).  13
Importantly, in torture this is a manufactured helplessness: unlike the infant, who of             
necessity is vulnerable and helpless, the helplessness of the one subjected to torture is              
‘produced artificially [...] In this sense, torture belongs to the type of circumstance in              
which the coincidence between the vulnerable and the helpless is the result of a series               
of acts, intentional and planned, aimed at bringing it about’ (ibid. 31). 
The example of torture makes clear that while it is the violation of the helpless               
body that most frequently and visibly arouses repugnance, what is significant is that it is               
the singular uniqueness that this body avows that is at the heart of the scene of horror.                 
This is important as for Cavarero, while the body (and especially the face) is an               
exemplar in exhibiting the singular uniqueness of the human, so too is the voice, not               
least because the voice for Cavarero is a properly embodied phenomenon (2005: 4). It              
is my argument that Cavarero’s account of horrorism needs to be retroactively read             
back into her earlier text ​For More than One Voice​, where two examples both              
demonstrate the origins of the notion of horrorism but also stress the vocalic             
significance of the phenomenon, something that is overlooked if one limits oneself to             
Horrorism​. These two examples are centred around two people: first the nymph Echo as              
narrated by Ovid; and second the child Hurbinek, as narrated by Primo Levi. 
 
Echo 
13 In the Italian, ‘helpless’ and ‘defenseless’ are ‘​l’inerme​’. See the translator's introduction (2011: vi-viii)                             
and Cavarero’s account of the etymology (ibid. 30) for further discussion. 
 
In ​For More than One Voice ​Cavarero is centrally concerned with moments where voice              
becomes disembodied, and here the myth of the nymph Echo is a prime example. Of               
the three well-known versions of the myth (two from Ovid and one from Longus)              
Cavarero focuses on Ovid’s original telling. Here, Echo - ‘a loquacious nymph [...]             
possessed of a typically feminine rhetorical talent’ (Cavarero 2005: 165) - distracts Juno             
through her words ‘while the other nymphs bed Jupiter’ (ibid.). Juno takes revenge on              
Echo by condemning her to ‘repeat the words of others’ (ibid.), but a repetition which is                
‘superimposed on the words that the speaker is pronouncing’ (ibid. 166) so that only the               
last few words of Echo’s repetition are heard. After this event Echo encounters             
Narcissus in a wooded glade. Echo is hidden from view behind a bush, repeating the               
words that Narcissus proclaims; however, only Echo’s final words are distinctly heard by             
Narcissus: 
the young boy invites her to join him. “Come here and let us meet [​huc               
coeamus​],” he says. And the voice of the nymph repeats, “Let us meet             
[​coeamus​].” Her response is naughty. For without the ​huc​, ​coeamus          
alludes to coitus. The nymph goes on to make the situation worse by             
jumping out of the woods and throwing her arms around Narcissus.           
Scandalized by her ardor, the boy then declares that he would rather die             
than couple with her; and Echo, automatically, invites him to couple, or            
rather copulate, with her (ibid.).  
Rejected by Narcissus, Echo begins to ‘wither away’ (ibid.) leaving ‘a pure voice of              
resonance without a body […] the beautiful nymph is sublimated into a mineralization of              
 
the voice’ (ibid.). Echo becomes echo, the disembodied acoustic repetition of voice. 
The withering away that Cavarero identifies is significant: Cavarero describes this           
as a ‘nullifying’ (ibid. 167) of Echo’s body, and it is because the body is nullified that                 
there is the ‘definitive dissolution of a uniqueness’ (ibid.). But in what sense is the body                
‘nullified’ here? There is certainly a nullifying when Echo’s body is reduced to stone, and               
importantly, as Cavarero highlights, ‘not the stone of a statue, but rather stone in              
general: rocks, boulders, mountains’ (ibid.). A statue would still reflect a uniqueness,            
even if in a reduced and sullied form. As stone, a part of the Earth but not, significantly,                  
the soil (which would be akin to a burial and place Echo too close to a form of returning                   
autochthon), Echo’s uniqueness is effaced. But this is the finality of her dissolution: can              
the same be said for what occurs before? And further, what of the temporal dimension               
of this withering away? As Cavarero describes it, Echo’s withering away has ‘certain             
anatomical details: first her flesh dries up, then her humors vanish, and then her bones               
turn to stone’ (ibid.). This is clearly a process​; a violent and, importantly, a painful               
process. In this process Echo does not so much ‘lose her body’ (ibid.) or have her body                 
nullified; rather, following Scarry, it seems that Echo’s body is ​most present in this              
painful withering away: for the one exposed to extreme pain their body is felt as               
‘overwhelmingly present’ (Scarry 1985: 46). There is certainly an ultimate nullifying, as            
Echo’s human form is effaced in a manner which denies her the human ritual of burial                
(and, following Sophocles’ ​Antigone​, we might ask the question who mourns for Echo?),            
but prior to this final nullifying, while there is certainly the ​threat of absolute               14
14  Cf. Judith Butler’s ​Antigone’s Claim ​(2000). 
 
nullification, more importantly there is the processual deconstruction of the body and its             
concomitant singular uniqueness. If one only focuses on the nullifying of Echo’s body             15
as the ‘definitive dissolution’ (ibid.) of Echo’s singular uniqueness, one effaces the pain             
which, as Scarry makes clear, is so central to extreme violent exploitation. Put the other               
way around, one can only conclude that Echo loses her body by ignoring the pain of a                 
processual dissolution which makes the body not lost but on the contrary ​overwhelming​,             
indeed, becomes overwhelming in direct relation to the absence of the ​semantike ​of             
logos​. After all, Echo’s experience perfectly illustrates the implicit devocalisation of           
logos that it is suggested is central to the structure of Scarry’s account of torture.               
Cavarero notes that Echo’s voice ‘results, like residual material, from its subtraction            
from the semantic register of logos’ (ibid. 166). Just as Scarry claims that in ‘the thick                
agony of the body [...] ​this voice, the sounds I am making, no longer form my words but                  
the words of another’ (1985: 35), so too Cavarero argues that 
If [Echo’s] sounds, separated from the context of the sentence, come           
together to form words that still signify something (or something else),           
then this is a matter for the listener, not the nymph [...] Echo is no longer a                 
zoon logon echon​; she no longer possess ​phone semantike​. She is           
instead pure ​phone​, activated by an involuntary mechanism of resonance          
(2005: 166-167). 
Echo’s violent and painful dissolution is not incidental to this process but is central.              
15 Cf. Cavarero's reading of Polynices’ imperiled disfiguring by wild beasts, and Antigone's desire to                             
protect her brother's ‘integral form’ through burial (2002: 32-33). 
 
Although the temporal order of events does not match the account found in Scarry (in               
that Echo loses her semantic capacity prior to the infliction of violence on her body),               
nonetheless it is important that the violent, painful, processual character of her withering             
away is related in proximity to her ‘desemanticization’ (ibid. 167). It is worth noting that               
in Longus’ account of Echo, her fate is to have her body torn to pieces so that only her                   
voice remains (2002: 57). 
Although Cavarero suggests that there is a ‘definitive dissolution’ of Echo’s           
uniqueness in the nullifying of her body, she does make clear that this uniqueness was               
already in an imperilled state: Echo’s uniqueness ​was already in a state of precarity in               
the ‘echo’ of Echo’s voice; Echo’s voice as echo ‘does not possess’ (ibid.) uniqueness.              
Cavarero goes on: 
Echo’s voice is, in fact, not ​her voice; it does not possess an unmistakable              
timbre, and it does not signal a unique person. It simply obeys the physical              
phenomenon of the echo, repeating even the timbre of the other’s voice. It             
is a mere acoustic resonance, a voice that returns, foreign, to the one who              
emitted it. The juxtaposition of Echo and Narcissus is therefore perfect.           
The absolute ego of Narcissus, for whom the other is nothing but “another             
himself,” corresponds to the reduction of the vocalic nymph to a mere            
sonorous reverberation of the other. The mechanism of repetition in the           
voice produces the annulment of uniqueness (ibid. 167-168). 
Two aspects of the scene concern Cavarero: the first is Echo’s voice becoming a voice               
in general, a fact of nature which can be reproduced by anyone who, standing in front of                 
 
a mountain, shouts; the second is Echo’s voice being a particular voice, but a particular               
voice of ​another (in this instance Narcissus). In both cases what is problematic, for              
Cavarero, is the effacement of uniqueness; either in generality (the echo can be             
anyone’s) or in specificity (the echo is not Echo’s and is in fact Narcissus’). But               
nonetheless, if one sidesteps the violence of Echo’s withering away what is missed is              
still the process of the processual dissolution of Echo’s uniqueness, which contains            
within it the threat of final nullification but is not reducible to this final nullification. In this                 
way Echo’s experience is a scene of horror. The responsibility for her violation may, in               
Ovid’s tale at least, fall somewhere between Juno and Narcissus in a way which              
obfuscates the violence of the devocalisation of ​logos​, but that violence is nonetheless             
integral to the meaning of the scene. Indeed, Cavarero’s reading almost perfectly            
mirrors Scarry’s account of torture: Narcissus’ ‘absolute ego’ corresponds to Echo’s           
‘sonorous reverberation’ in precisely the same way that the torturer’s ‘swelling sense of             
territory’ (Scarry 1985: 36) corresponds to the prisoner’s ‘small and shredded world’            
(ibid.). Further, however, by reading the experience of Echo as a form of horrorism one               
can see that what is proper to the horror is not simply the final nullification of Echo’s                 
body, but more significantly the suspended state of dissolution her uniqueness,           
expressed through her body and voice, is placed in. 
 
Hurbinek 
In the closing of ​For More than One Voice​, prior to her appraisal of Jacques Derrida,                
Cavarero offers some brief reflections on the other side of her thesis of vocalic              
 
uniqueness; that is, the destruction of this uniqueness (foreshadowing the work           
Cavarero will do in ​Horrorism​). Following Arendt, Cavarero takes the Nazi ​Lager ​as a              
principle moment in the history of this destruction. Cavarero takes as her subject an              
account offered by Primo Levi, of the appearance of a child of approximately three              
years of age in the days after the liberation of Auschwitz (Levi 1987: 197-198). The child                
could not speak any discernable language; he was given the name Hurbinek. Although             
he could not speak, the child repeated a series of sounds in a manner which suggested                
a variation on a particular theme, which it was presumed were attempts to signify              
meaning, either his name or ‘“to eat”, or “bread”; or perhaps “meat”’ (ibid. 198). For               
Cavarero, the destruction of voice and with it uniqueness, particularly the destruction of             
voice in a child (that absolutely defenseless existent) is of utmost importance:            
Cavarero’s account of what it is to be human rests on this uniqueness. The destruction               
of this uniqueness exemplified in the ​Lager ​is thus not so much a challenge to her thesis                 
(indeed, the opposite could be said to be true) but it does pose a challenge to the                 
ethical efficacy of such a thesis. Of course, the challenge of the Holocaust to              
philosophers is not unique to Cavarero; nonetheless, this is an especially pressing issue             
for Cavarero given the primacy she affords to the vocalic as an expression of the               
particular, relational, singular uniqueness of the human. As Cavarero herself argues,           
‘[a]ny present day reflection on horror must, sooner or later, come to terms with              
Auschwitz’ (2011: 34). 
Cavarero points out that ‘[t]he other deportees therefore attribute to the           
articulated sounds of the child the intention to signify’ (2005: 211), a conclusion             
 
Cavarero seems content with. Cavarero goes on: ‘Hurbinek’s voice, precisely because it            
modulates variations on a theme, already makes its destination to speech perceptible’            
(ibid.). In Hurbinek’s vocalic expressions, which further do not appear arbitrary but            
rather are related by a presumed theme which is approached through the variation and              
modulation of the vocalic (one can think here of musical improvisation), Cavarero hears             
Hurbinek’s ‘destination to speech’ (ibid.). Earlier, Cavarero has suggested that ‘speech           
is [voice’s] essential destination’ (ibid. 209); that, although both humans and animals            
share a voice, it is the destination to speech which distinguishes the human voice: 
The humanity of human beings plays out precisely along the division           
(which is rooted in the vocalic) of this destination. Which means the            
interweaving of voice and speech, which is not necessary [​sic​]          
synchronous, cannot be severed without sacrificing humanity itself; this         
goes for both animal voice and the devocalized logos (ibid. 209-210). 
‘Hurbinek is saved’ (ibid. 211) precisely because of his voice’s destination to speech, a              
destination to speech which is identified by the modulations and variations around a             
particular theme, which may be his name, or may be something to eat, but in either                
case cannot be identified by its semantic content. On the register of the semantic,              
Hurbinek’s speech is ‘a nonlanguage that sinks into the abyss of the nonhuman’ (ibid.);              
but, by focusing on the register of the vocalic, Cavarero maintains that the ‘act’ (ibid.) of                
Hurbinek’s ‘sonorous articulations [...] already intones the truth of a voice that is             
destined to speech and that is thus peremptorily human’ (ibid.). Note that Cavarero             
chooses to highlight Hurbinek’s ‘sonorous ​articulations​’: this is something more than           
 
mere sonority, mere vocality, presumably distinguished from ​phone by the modulations           
and variations around a theme; these variations mark Hurbinek’s vocality as           
articulations and therefore destined for speech (even if not yet speech), which crucially             
makes them (and by association Hurbinek) ‘peremptorily human’ (ibid.). ‘Rather than           
being the tragic little exemplar of the nonhuman’ Cavarero argues, ‘he is the             
announcement, under infernal conditions, of the quintessence of the human that the            
voice destines to speech’ (ibid.). So not only is the voice destined to speech, it also                
destines something to speech, this something being the announcement of the           
quintessence of the human. The voice sets this announcement of the quintessence of             
the human on its way. It is not the announcement itself, but neither is it ‘an inarticulate                 
cry’ (ibid. 212): 
Rather, his is a voice in which the acoustically perceptible phenomenon of            
uniqueness, here emphasized by the lack of access to the semantic,           
modulates itself with experimental variations on a theme; it mimes the           
musicality of speech, the relational fabric of resonance, the echo that           
comes from the mouth for the ear of the other (ibid.). 
Before Hurbinek’s death soon after being found, he ‘[tasted] the human intonation of             
speech’ (ibid.) which ‘tells us that his tragedy is not like that of the “children of the wild”                  
who are raised without human contact’ (ibid.); that is, Hurbinek was not an animal. 
If for Cavarero what distinguishes the human from the animal is that the voice of               
the human is ‘destined to speech’ (ibid. 13), then Hurbinek’s case makes this explicit: he               
was saved precisely because the sonority of his voice expressed modulations and            
 
variations which demonstrated the destination of his vocalisations to speech, even if this             
speech was denied to him at his death. Much weight is therefore placed on these               
modulations and variations - these experimentations on a theme - in that without them              
Hurbinek would be consigned to Levi’s ‘drowned’ (1998); he would not be ‘free’ (Levi              
1987: 198). It is necessary to pause here and ask a series of related questions. What                
would Hurbinek’s voice be (and consequently what would ​Hurbinek ​be) without these            
variations and modulations which mark his destination to speech? By extension, what            
work is the variation and modulation doing and what qualifies it for this job? What of the                 
other deportees who bear witness to Hurbinek’s articulations? The concern is that if             16
the prelinguistic voice of the human is only distinguishable from other animals through             
the voice’s ‘destination to speech’ (Cavarero 2005: 209), then the interruption of this             
destination renders the one vocalising either infantile or animal. As has been noted,             
‘infantile’ would be the more accurate description (the animal’s voice is not destined to              
speech) except that, in Hurbinek’s case, he is already an infant. If, as it has been                
argued, in the horror of torture there is a separation of ​phone ​from ​logos - a violent                 
splitting of the ambivalence of ​logos - then ​following Cavarero voice is also separated ​to               
speech, in that speech is voice’s essential destination. Torture is an interruption of this              
essentiality: it works on this essentiality, placing speech an eternal distance away by             
maintaining the prisoner’s singular uniqueness in a state of suspended dissolution.           
Cavarero ends her account of Hurbinek by noting that ‘[h]e is the warning - albeit               
extreme - to every rethinking of ontology that aspires to radically reestablish the bond              
16 Cf. Giorgio Agamben’s comments on Hurbinek in ​Remnants of Auschwitz​: ‘Perhaps every word, every                             
writing, is born [...] as testimony. This is why what is borne witness to cannot already be language and                                     
writing. It can only be something to which no one has borne witness’ (2002: 38). 
 
between speech and politics’ (2005: 212). This is no doubt true, but it is equally true for                 
an ontology which reestablishes the bond between speech and what it is to be human.               
Cavarero qualifies her account by highlighting that ‘[t]he voice is invoked here because             
of its destination to speech, but in such a way that speech is never authorized to erase                 
the reciprocal communication of uniqueness that the voice announces and destines to it’             
(ibid. 210), but as Cavarero’s reading of Hurbinek shows, an interruption of this             
destination to speech is of central concern. 
 
Voice’s ‘Destination to Speech’ 
This is precisely the same issue one is challenged with in Scarry’s account of torture. If                
one begins by privileging speech as central to the human, as Scarry implicitly does,              
then one is ineluctably drawn to characterising those whose speech has been radically             
interrupted as being somehow less than human (whether infantile or animal). Cavarero            
offers some resources to avoid this conclusion: for Cavarero, voice first communicates            
not only its essential destination to speech, but ​uniqueness​, a properly human quality: 
Every human voice is obviously a sound, an acoustic vibration among           
others, which is measurable like all other sounds; but it is only as human              
that the voice comes to be perceived as unique. This means that            
uniqueness resounds in the human voice; or, in the human voice,           
uniqueness makes itself sound (ibid. 177). 
Focusing on the necessary uniqueness that is expressed through the voice rather than             
 
the voice’s essential destination to speech avoids the essentialisation of speech as the             
defining characteristic of the human: whether or not Hurbinek’s vocalisations reveal their            
destination to speech (and thus his humanness), his voice is, to begin with and of               
necessity, expressive of his singular uniqueness which is proper to the human. This             
would require moving Cavarero’s account away from that of Arendt: for both Cavarero             
and Arendt, the uniqueness of humans and their destination to speech are entwined             
phenomena and should not be extricated from one another. Cavarero does not want to              17
do away with speech, but rather wants to insist on the simple fact that speech cannot                
occur without vocalisation, and that vocalisation communicates uniqueness. Cavarero         
poses a challenge to any thinking of speech which would refuse this embodied             
uniqueness in the name of a disembodied realm of metaphysical truths: 
By rooting speech immediately in the body, which is the voice’s source            
and chamber of resonance, the vocal first of all situates the act of             
reciprocal communication over and against a universal conception of         
language that turns the speakers into fictitious entities (ibid. 206-207). 
She goes one: 
[...] it is not a matter of overcoming or erasing speech, but rather of              
keeping the primary sense of speech in proximity to the relational plurality            
of voices that originate speech, or that materialize it, as it were, by making              
it sing (ibid. 210). 
17 See Arendt’s ​The Human Condition​, where Arendt argues ‘human plurality is the paradoxical plurality                             
of unique beings [...] Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness’ (1998: 176). 
 
But in this process of offering a counter-account of speech, Cavarero not only fuses              
speech to the uniqueness of voice but also, inevitably, enacts the reverse: voice is              
concomitantly fused to speech; voice is destined ​to speech. If it is the case that ‘[w]hat                
in speech convokes the relation among speakers is, first of all, the voice’ (ibid. 208),               
then for what reason does uniqueness need to be tied to speech in the form of voice’s                 
essential destination? Cavarero argues that ‘the voice that sacrifices speech to the            
subversive effects of an absolute pleasure risks crossing the threshold of the animal             
realm’ (ibid. 209). If one were restricted to a discussion of politics this point would hold                
some valence, particularly if one is willing to accept that what is proper to politics is                
speech. And indeed, Cavarero’s discussion of the distinction between the animal and            
the human occurs in a section of ​For More than One Voice concerned with the politics                
of ​logos​, articulated via, among others, Arendt. But as can be seen in the example of                
Hurbinek, Cavarero slips out of this political realm to make speech essential to the              
communication of human uniqueness via the voice. This seems an unnecessary step if             
phone already expresses uniqueness, a uniqueness that cannot be stifled by the            
eradication of ​semantike​. 
However, the position that insists on uniqueness being proper to being human -             
as opposed to voice’s destination to speech - itself is not immune from challenge: it is                
necessary to ask after the conditions that make possible the revelation of this             
uniqueness. If there are such conditions - and surely there must be, since as it has been                 
demonstrated Cavarero seems content to maintain the distinction Aristotle formulates          
between ​political animals and mere animals (ibid. 209) - then the assertion of the              
 
humanity of the body in pain can be undermined by inhibiting the conditions that would               
allow for the revelation of a person’s uniqueness. Put in a different manner, it could be                
argued that Cavarero’s account of vocal uniqueness pays insufficient attention to what            
Jacques Rancière identifies: that any account of voice and speech is always a ​partage​,              
a particular partitioning, which first determines which vocalisations count as proper to            
the human (Rancière 1999). It might be objected that Cavarero is trying to sidestep this               
debate by emphasising speech’s inevitable dependence on the vocalic and the           
significance not of the ​content of speech but of the fact that ​someone is speaking. But                
this can only take one so far: it is necessary to ask why the vocalisation of an animal                  
does not signify a singular, unique being; and if this question can be asked of the animal                 
it can also be asked of the slave. Cavarero’s dependence on an account of human               
voice’s destination to speech now becomes more apparent, even if it does not resolve              
the tension. What is required is a situation where the asking of the question becomes               
impossible; a no doubt impossible request for any ontology which can still be described,              
in one form or another, as committed to a type of humanism. Rather than situating a                
defense of the human in vocalisation’s destination to speech, it would be better to focus               
on Cavarero’s insistence that singular uniqueness is not a uniqueness ​in general​:            
uniqueness is not proper to Man, or even Woman, but instead proper to men and               
women (and many others) in their specificity. If this is a non-generalisable uniqueness it              
is also a uniqueness that can only be articulated in relation to others: uniqueness of               
necessity only becomes apparent in a plurality of others; one cannot be unique without              
others to be unique in relation to. The posing of the question ‘is this voice the voice of a                   
 
human?’ already presumes a generalised, universal conception of ​the ​human (as           
opposed to ​this ​or ​that ​human) against which the sonorous emission can be measured,              
and this is precisely what Cavarero is rejecting. The debate is far larger than this article                
can do justice to, but nonetheless it is important to note that the voice’s destination to                
speech (or lack of it) too easily begs the question of the generalised human in the                
abstract. 
Hurbinek’s uniqueness was not effaced because his voice’s destination to          
speech was undermined, just as the uniqueness of the prisoner in the scene of torture               
that Scarry presents us with is not undermined because the ​semantike ​of their ​logos              
has been stripped away. Indeed, Scarry’s account of torture makes evident something            
that is not clearly noted in Cavarero’s account of horrorism. Throughout Cavarero’s            
examples of horrorism, whether taken from the text ​Horrorism ​or retroactively read into             
the examples of Echo and Hurbinek in ​For More than One Voice​, what is presumed               
central to horrorism is the ‘ontological crime’ (2011: 29) of the destruction of singular              
uniqueness in the helpless. However, Scarry’s account of torture offers good reasons to             
suppose that what is horrifying in horrorism can also be thought of as the opposite of                
this formulation. That is, not only is killing not proper to horrorism, but further neither is it                 
not simply (or not only) the destruction of singular uniqueness: additionally, it is the              
placing of this singular uniqueness into ​a suspended state of dissolution​, where the final              
extinguishing of this singular uniqueness may or may not be threatened, but in either              
case is always imperilled. On this reading what is especially grotesque in torture is the               
prolongation of the singularity and uniqueness of the prisoner: the violence of torture is              
 
premised on the repeated violation of this singular uniqueness which therefore requires            
a certain sense of ‘care’ to ensure its sustenance. Without the prolonged targeting of              18
this singular uniqueness torture would be a generic violence or killing. This            19
complicates Cavarero’s account of the ethical valence of uniqueness and singularity.           
The violation of the singular uniqueness of the prisoner is not just a particular aim or                
strategy of torture: this would be a generalised recognition of singular uniqueness (the             
Human is singular and unique) and thus at best only a partial recognition of singular               
uniqueness. Rather, the violence of torture precisely depends upon the torturer           
recognising and exploiting ​this particular singular uniqueness of ​this particular person:           
not a singular uniqueness in general, but revealed in the intimate proximity of the              
torturer and the tortured. It is this relational intimacy that is exploited in torture, this               
recognition of a particular singular uniqueness, which in other instances would be a             
necessary condition for the establishment of reciprocal or nonreciprocal care, while in            
torture is grotesquely inverted. It is crucial that the torturer maintains, sustains and             
prolongs the singular uniqueness of the particular person in front of him or her. If in                
Cavarero’s work there is an ethical impetus to understand ​who someone is rather than              
what ​someone is (2000: 50), in the ‘idealised’ account of torture that Scarry offers us the                
ethical valence of the ‘who’ gets inverted: the torturer exploits this ‘who’ as a means to                
18 Cf. Lauren Wilcox’ ‘Dying Is Not Permitted’ in her ​Bodies of Violence ​(2015: 49-79). 
19 An important exception to the violence of torture targeting the singular uniqueness of the prisoner are                                 
the iconic images of U.S. torture at the Abu Ghraib detention facility. As Cavarero notes, the Abu Ghraib                                   
prisoners ‘are anonymous bodies, often photographed from behind or with hoods on their heads in order                               
to cancel the singularity of their faces [...] the humiliation consisted of a dehumanization at the hands of                                   
the director, who, in the frame of the shots, intentionally covered the facial features of uniqueness and                                 
annulled them’ (2011: 113). Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to imagine that what is proper to torture                                   
is the annulling of uniqueness, even if this was no doubt central to the torture depicted in the images                                     
from Abu Ghraib. Torture may resolve itself into an annulling of uniqueness, but first it must recognise                                 
and maintain this uniqueness. 
 
the further infliction of suffering. Torture is no doubt an exemplar of what Cavarero              
means by horrorism, but far from effacing the singular uniqueness of the prisoner the              
torturer instead offers it a gross reverence. 
 
Romeo’s ‘Singular Flesh’ 
Cavarero’s ​For More than One Voices ​ends with a discussion of Derrida’s reading of              
Shakespeare’s ​Romeo and Juliet​. In this reading Cavarero offers a critique of Derrida,             
arguing that Derrida overlooks the fact that the ‘ontological status’ (2005: 235) of             
Romeo - ‘the singularity of the human being loved by Juliet’ (ibid.) - is communicated               
not by his name but rather by his voice. For Cavarero, ‘[r]ecognizing Romeo’s voice, the               
young girl recognizes the uniqueness of the loved one, separable from the proper name’              
(ibid.). Cavarero’s reading of the scene offers a clear account of her insistence on the               
voice as an embodied phenomenon expressive of the singular uniqueness of a person,             
and further that this uniqueness can be accounted for without recourse to the voice’s              
‘destination to speech’ (ibid. 210), as it has previously been suggested in this article.              
What becomes clear in Cavarero’s reading is that uniqueness is most apparent when             
freed from the proper name; that is, when it is communicated through voice, as is the                
case in Shakespeare’s balcony scene where, shrouded in darkness, ‘the dialogue           
unfolds between two people who do not see one another’ (ibid. 237). Juliet recognises              
Romeo’s uniqueness by his voice, ‘beyond the name itself, beyond speech and even             
beyond language’ (ibid. 238). Romeo’s name, although it ‘evokes uniqueness’ (ibid.), in            
fact interrupts ​who ​Romeo is by focusing instead on ​what ​he is; that is, Romeo is a                 
 
Montague. But as Cavarero notes, 
Juliet, as is natural for lovers, does not love what Romeo is but rather who               
he is. She loves Romeo’s uniqueness, and asks him to separate himself            
from that proper name that, while it announces the uniqueness of the one             
who bears it, renders the reality of their love improper, in the context of the               
feud between Montague and Capulet (ibid.). 
Romeo’s uniqueness is situated in ‘the physical, corporeal element of the voice’ (ibid.),             
not his name ‘which belongs instead to the verbal register’ (ibid.). Crucially for Cavarero,              
‘[t]he name is not flesh; still less is it singular flesh. The voice, however, is’ (ibid.). On                 
Cavarero’s reading, Juliet wishes to ‘separate’ (ibid.) Romeo’s embodied uniqueness          
from his disembodied name: ‘if the problem is how to separate the embodied             
uniqueness from the name - from that word, the proper name, that already alludes to               
the uniqueness - then the voice is what allows for this separation’ (ibid. 239). Cavarero’s               
previous coupling of uniqueness to voice’s ‘destination to speech’ (ibid. 209) has been             
lost here; indeed, it has been actively undermined to the extent that Cavarero is hostile               
to the name: ‘the solution lies’, Cavarero suggests, ‘in parting from the proper name and               
in separating it from the embodied uniqueness of the one who bears it. So that this very                 
uniqueness, finally freed from the name Romeo, can take another name’ (ibid. 239).             
Without parting from the proper name one’s uniqueness cannot take another name: ‘the             
proper name is nothing but an inessential, and thus modifiable, addition [...] in the voice               
there resounds a singularity that can leave speech aside [...] The voice is the way in                
which the exquisitely human uniqueness emits its essence’ (ibid. 239-240). Cavarero           
 
could neither be clearer nor further from an account of uniqueness that situates it in               
voice’s destination to speech. 
There is a valorisation of embodied vocality in this account of Cavarero’s,            
precisely to the extent that the embodied voice expresses uniqueness; conversely, it is             
clear that the proper name should be separated from voice to the extent that the proper                
name effaces this uniqueness. This theme is present throughout Cavarero’s work,           
explicitly seen in the examples of Echo and Hurbinek whose suffering is tied up in the                
destruction of their uniqueness, and manifest in the various examples of contemporary            
violence that Cavarero deploys in ​Horrorism​. To finish, however, it is necessary to             
return to Scarry’s account of torture which complicates this division between, on the one              
hand, the horrors of the effacing of an embodied uniqueness and, on the other, the               
human flourishing associated with the sonority of the voice. For if Romeo’s uniqueness             
is to be celebrated as it is expressed in his embodied voice, freed from his disembodied                
name, then in Scarry’s scene of torture we see the reversal of this process. Central to                
the horrorism of torture is the separation of voice from name. For Scarry, one’s use of                
language and one’s sense of ‘self and world’ (1985: 35) are ‘deconstructed’ (ibid. 20) in               
torture, and in contrast the body - the particular, singularly unique body of the one               
experiencing extreme pain - becomes ever more present. If for Romeo and Juliet the              
separating of name from voice and body is a condition for the flourishing of their love, in                 
torture the same separation is a condition for a paradigmatic instance of horrorism. If              
what Juliet loves in Romeo is his ‘singular flesh’ (Cavarero 2005: 238) expressed first in               
his voice, in the horror of torture there is the production of ‘singular flesh’ in the extreme:                 
 
‘the body and its pain are overwhelmingly present’ (Scarry 1985: 46). Crucially, what             
changes is not a proper regard for embodied uniqueness in the case of Romeo and               
Juliet’s love and a disregarding of embodied uniqueness in the scene of torture. In              
torture, as it has already been argued, there is a gross reverence for the singular,               
embodied uniqueness of the one tortured. Torture imperils this singular, embodied           
uniqueness - it maintains it in a suspended state of dissolution - but it does so not by                  
disregarding uniqueness but by giving uniqueness its utmost attention. Cavarero is not            
wrong to recognise the value of uniqueness, its proper expression in the voice, or its               
indifference to the semantic content of speech. But as Scarry’s scene of torture             
indicates, the horror of horrorism can be aroused not only by the disregarding or              
annulling of singular uniqueness but also by its grotesque reveration. 
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